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DETERMINANTS OF OPTION SPREADS IN A MULTIPLE LISTING ENVIRONMENT 
Rebecca Abraham , Nova Southeastem U ni versity 
Charl es Harrington , Nova Southeastem University 
This study empirically determined the predictors of bid-ask spreads of equity options within the context of 
the current multiple-listed options market. Price emerged as the most powerful predictor followed by 
multiple listing. Price and volatility increased spreads, while multiple listing and volume reduced them. 
Multiple listing was more powetful than volume in explaining !>preads. This study establishes that spread 
reductions prevail several years after initial multiple listing and supports the importance of competition 
over economies of scale in explaining spreads. 
INTRODUCTION 
Si nce their inception in 1975, trading in equ ity 
options was first confi ned to the C hi cago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE) and the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) then spread to the Pacific Stock Exchange 
(PCX), the Philadelph ia Stock Exchange (PHLX), the 
Boston Stock Exchange (BOX) , and most recentl y, the 
Internationa l Securities Exchange ( ISE). The bid-ask 
spread is charged by m arke t maker on the exchanges to 
traders as a transactions fee. It is the profit to the market 
maker whose purchase quote for options is the bid pri ce 
and the sa le quote to broker-dea lers is the ask price. 
Demetz's (1968) seminal work identifi es the bid-ask 
spread as "the markup that is pai d for pred ictable 
immediacy of exchan ge In organ ized markets" 
(Demsetz, 1968: 35 -36). The marke t maker is bei ng 
compensa ted for the func tion of making op tions 
ava i !ab le to c ustomers ~md the bid-as k spread is the 
premium paid to marke t makers for supp ly ing opt ions. 
T rad itiona ll y, the bu lks of equ ity option s ha ve been 
b·aded on a s ingle exchange or are s ing le- li sted opti on s. 
This provided exclus ive and potentially exorbitant 
franchi se fees to the exchanges as the bid-ask spreads 
charged on the options could be set independentl y by a 
sing le exchange wi th no competiti ve pressures forc ing 
prices downward (as no other exchange could list the 
sa me op ti on). ln an a tt empt to impro ve the qua li ty of 
service and decrease spreads, the U. S. Sec uriti es and 
Exchange Commi ss ion 
(SEC) adopted Rul e 19c-5 in 1980 which mandated 
mult ip le listing. The exc hanges vigo rously res isted 
m ultipl e listin g for a decade . T he ir reca lc itrance ended 
with the Justice Department t~ l in g suit against the 
Ame ri can Stock Exchange in 2000, the sett lement of the 
suit be in g cont ingent upon the exchanges Jccep ting a 
consent decree to re fon11 the ma rke t w ith a view towa rds 
increasing competit io n. 
20 
For the past fo ur years, the exchanges have plunged 
into campa igns des igned to attract other exchanges to 
purchas ing opti ons that had hi therto been s ingly li sted so 
that at present, full y 85% of put and ca ll options traded 
on the American Stock Exc hange are multiple li sted. 
During the options campaign of 1999 a lone, li stings on a 
s ingle exchange declined in vo lu me fro m 61 % during 
the pre-opti ons ca .. Ipaign phase to 24% at the c lose of 
the campa ign . We may as ume that the current options 
market is a matu re marke t fro m a multiple li sting 
perspecti ve. 
Other de ten11inants of opt ion spreads derived fro m 
the literature (sec Coughenour & Shastri , 1999, for a 
rcvicvv) include price, vo lume of tTading, and the 
vo lat il ity of opti on prices. T radi ti ona l mode ls of spreads 
( Benston & Hagerman, 197-+: oughenour & Shastri , 
1999. George, Ka ul , & Tima lendran. 199 1; Huang & 
Sto ll , 1997) ha ve incorpora ted these predictors. T he few 
empiri cal studies of mu ltipl e li s ting e ffects on spread 
we re performed in the immed iate a ftermath of a 
parti cular options campa ign in the 1 980s and late 1990s 
befo re the majori ty of options beca me multip le li sted 
and ·were there fore, confined to sma ll sample s izes of 
abo ut 70-2 80 option s (Dan is, 2003; De Fontnouve ll e, 
2003; Mayhew, 2002 ; Nea l, 1987). Consequentl y, there 
is a need fo r a la rge-sca le a sessment of spreads that 
inc ludes bo th the traditiona l pric ing variables and 
multiple li s ting. It is thi s obj ecti ve to which thi s study is 
direc ted . 
Predicto rs of O ption Spreads 
As stated, the bid-ask spread may be likened to a 
transJc ti ons fee. Accordi ng ly, the hi gher the pri ce of a 
good, the hi gher w ill be the fee (Nea l, 1987). Dani s 
(2003) used the exa mpl e o f a commi ss ion to be paid to 
the deale r se llin g a $ -10,000 Lex us being substanti a ll y 
higher than th Jt paid to a dea ler o f· a£ 1,000 car. Khowy 
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et al. (2002) argued that the options price is an 
investment in options inventories that provides liquidi ty 
in the market. As prices ri se, there is greater investment 
in options inventories, and in tum, hi gher bid-ask 
spreads. They tested the di ffe renti al effects of price, 
number of daily transactions, and the in- or out-of-the-
money status of the option for options li sted on both the 
U.S. and Montreal exchanges. Price was fo und to be the 
most powerful predictor of bid-ask spreads accounting 
for 31 .6% of the variation in spreads. 
Bid-ask spreads are reduced with rising volumes . As 
orders for the purchase or sa le of options arrive through 
broker-dealers, the market maker uses the inventory of 
options available to provide options . T he market maker 
is being compensated for the function of making options 
available to customers and the bid-ask spread is the 
premium paid to market makers for suppl ying options . 
With options being made avai lable for sa le on multiple 
exchanges, volumes rise . Rising vo lumes mean that 
more orders are an·iving to be executed by the market 
maker, so that the market maker need not be 
compensated highly for making options avai lable for 
sa le. In other words, bid-ask spreads decrease with rising 
volumes (Danis, 2003). 
Volatility is the ri sk to the market maker of holding 
options on a particular stock. The higher the risk, the 
greater the retum the market maker wi ll demand for 
holding the option. As the retum to the market maker is 
the bid-ask spread, a rise in risk will lead to the demand 
for higher bid-ask spreads (Dani s, 2003) . The dea ler is 
forced off the effic ient fro nti er and hi s initial 
indi fference curv e consisting of optimal portfo lio 
combinations of the ri sk-free asset and ri sky assets by 
investors with their own stock and option preferences. 
Customers have to pay the dealer an additiona l 
amount to keep him satisfied at the new in vestment leve l 
with its higher level of risk That additiona l amount is a 
higher bid-ask spread so that increas ing vo latility is 
associated with higher spreads (Stol l, 1978). 
Empirically, tests of the impact of vo lati li ty on bid-ask 
spreads have shown weak results w ith vo latility being 
either insign ificant in exp la ining spreads (De 
Fontnouvelle et a l. , 2004; Khoury et a l. , 2002) or w ith 
inconsistent signs (Dani s, 2003 , Nea l, 1987) . Perhaps, as 
Nea l conj ectured , there is bias in the method o f 
determining volatility, i. e. , as the standard deviatio n o f 
transactions prices . T he bid-ask spread will cause the 
sequence of transactions to fluctuate about the true pri ce. 
so that spreads and volatility wi ll have pos iti ve 
con·elations rega rdless of security ri sk, or spreads wi ll be 
overstated. 
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Intuiti ve ly, as the spread is compensa ti on to the 
market maker for providing an inventory o f options, the 
presence of market maker offering identica l products on 
other exchanges should ca use a ll market makers to 
reduce transac tion fees (spreads) to rema in competiti ve 
in attracting customers. The fear o f fragmenta tion or loss 
of order flow to ri val exchanges is suffi c ient incentive to 
keep spreads at lower competiti ve prices (Coughenour & 
Shastri , 1999) . Empirica l support for thi s thes is is 
provided by severa l observations o f the formation of 
competiti ve equilibria either thro ugh s imul ations or on 
the trading floor. Bloomfield and O 'Hara ( 1998) 
demonstrated that spread dec lined fa r more rapid ly in 
three-dealer markets than two or s ingle dea ler markets 
primarily due to the fact that the competiti ve effect of 
the addition of a third dealer in a two-dealer market 
causes the ex isting dea lers to lower their ask prices and 
rai se the ir bid prices to attract order fl ow. 
In the competitive market, spreads dec lined to 79% in 
a three-dea ler market with a decline o f onl y 56% of 
average spreads in the two-dealer market. G iven that 
options may be mu ltipl e listed on up to six di ffe rent 
exchanges, the competiti ve effects of adding the fourth, 
fifth , and s ixth dealers will only intensify the 
competiti ve effec t o f the third dea ler. Batta lio, Greene, 
& Jenning (1 997) used trading fl oor data fro m an 
adjustment instituted to attrac t order flow to regional 
exchanges by pem1itting tTaders to become dealers on 
those exchanges . Spreads on the primary exchange 
dec lined by 66% and those on the reg ional exchanges 
did not in crease a fter trading commenced on the e 
exchanges as they continued to direct order fl ow at the 
national best bid and offer pri ces. 
Multiple listing was the outcome of the Justice 
Departrnem s filin g suit aga in st the exchanges for 
noncompetiti ve action . A regul atory requ irement th us 
forced competiti on among exchanges that had long 
co lluded to keep most o ptions s ingl y listed. F rom the 
literature o n the effect of regulatory refom1s on the stoc k 
exchanges, Barclay ct a l. ( 1999) assessed the impact of 
intToducing li mit orde rs subm itted by the publi c in a 
mu l tipl e-d c~!l e r marke t and ful l di sc losure to NAS DAQ 
traders of superi or quotes offered by NASDAQ dea lers 
to each other in pri vate trading locations. Both refonns 
were unde rtaken with a great deal of publicity and 
exposure o f hi therto no ncompetitive pr:Jc tices. Like\\ isc, 
the Justi ce Depa rt ment 's action was accompan ied by a 
grea t dea l of negatin=-: pub lic it y about collus ive price 
all oca ti on by the exc hanges . 
T hat competiti on \\'a s the main predi ctor of the 
dec line in spre:Jd s is supported by the 8Jrc lay et al. 
2
Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching (2005-2012), Vol. 2 [2006], No. 1, Art. 4
http://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol2/iss1/4
Abraham and HarTington 
( 1999) study with spreads in their post-reform NASDAQ 
sample converging to the lower levels of the NYSE 
(Barclay et al. , 1999). Specifically, Barclay et al. ( 1999) 
averaged effective spreads of$ 0.179 and $ .169 for two 
separate NASDAQ samples while Huang and Stoll' s 
( 1978) active ly !Taded NYSE stocks showed spreads of$ 
0. 158. We may also use the literature on the regulatory 
effects of establi shing a National Market System 
requiring the exchange of real-time quote information 
across stock exchanges (see Coughenour & Shastri, 
1999, for a review) . In a variety of environments, 
spreads decreased with the introduction of shared quotes 
by more dea lers on the U.S. stock exchanges (Benston & 
Hagerman , 1974; Stoll , 1978), the London Stock 
Exchange (Hansch, Naik, & Vishwanathan , 1998) and 
the interbank foreign exchange market (Huang & 
Masulis, 1999). 
Given the above review, we may state the hypotheses as 
follows: 
• H 1, Bid-ask spreads of equi ty options vary directl y 
wi th option prices. 
• H 2: Bid-ask spreads of equity options vary directly 
with option volat ili ty. 
• H 3 : Bid-ask spreads of equity options vary inversely 
with option vo lume. 
Jouma l of Business and Leadership: Research , Practice, and Teaching 
• H4 : Bid-ask spreads of equity options vary inversely 
with multiple li sting. Specifically, multiple listed 
options will have sign ificantly lower bid-ask spreads 
than single li sted opti ons. 
METHODOLOGY 
All stocks traded on the AMEX as of July 1, 2004, 
were screened. The data range was the first five trading 
days of Jul y 2004, or July 1-3, and 6-7, 2004. We first 
excluded all American Depos itory Receipts, and foreign 
fi1ms. After exc lusion of foreign stocks, and those with 
mi ssing data , the fina l sample of options on the 
remaining stocks consisted of 10,577 call options and 
8,599 put options traded in July 2004. Only near-term (1 
month maturi ties) , at-the-money options were used. 
Additional quote data fi lters included (1) that ask 
quotes be greater than bid quotes, (2) all bid quotes be 
greater than zero . Trade data fi lters included (1) 
identify ing exchanges and I isting dates from Options 
Industry Coun cil da ta only, (2) ensuring that trade price 
and trade size we ..: greater than zero, and (3) restricting 
trades to AM ~X- Ii sted stocks. Using separate data from 
the AMEX, the number of single and multiple li sted 
options was detem1ined (tab le 1), with 1,736 single li sted 
ca ll s and I ,3 20 sin gle I is ted puts and 8,84 1 multiple-
listed ca ll opti ons and 7,279 multiple-li sted put options. 




. 11 -. 1 5 
. 16· 20 
.2 1- .25 
>. 25 
Hfec ti ve 
fl id-1\sk Spread 
<=.05 
06- .10 
. II - 20 
.2 1- 30 
>. 30 
Number o f Exchanges Call s Pu ts 
One Exch:mge 1736 1320 
Two Exchanges 1501 1249 
Three Exc hanges 1791 14 83 
Four Exchanges 1974 1645 
Five Exchanges 1688 141 3 
Six Exchanges 1887 1-189 
Table 2: Relative Frequency Distribution of Quoted and 
Effective Bid-Ask Spreads of Equity Optio ns 
Relat ive Fr<Oquency Relati ve Freq uency Relat ive Frequency Relative Frequency Multiple- Li sted 
Single- ! iSted Ca ll Multiple- Li sted S111gle-Listed Put Options(%) 
OptiOns(%) Ca ll Opuons (%) Put Options(%) 
6.3 1 41 .86 5 67 42 04 
6.54 13.45 6.95 12 .58 
1-1 .86 21.44 16.55 22.70 
37. 18 5 42 40.67 6 .78 
35 11 IH3 30. 16 15.90 
Relati ve Frequency Relative frequency Relative Frequency Relauve JCrequency Multiple-Listed 
Sing l c- L~>tcd Ca ll Multiple- Li sted S111 glc- Listed Put Oprions (%) 
Opuons (%) Ca ll Op tio ns(%) Put Op ti ons(%) 
10.88 38.59 7 .0-l 71.5 1 
11 .85 13.27 628 5.79 
21 .0 1 11 48 18.32 5.52 
5.0.J 5.62 7.34 3.20 
51 .00 3 1 00 60 79 139 1 
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For both call and put options, the majori ty of the 
options were li sted on four exchanges. T he mean quoted 
bid-ask spreads were significantly hi gher for single-
listed over multiple-listed options for calls and puts for 
both quoted spreads (t = 27.55 , p <.00 1, 5 1 = .29, 5 2 = .17 
for calls and t = 3.45 , p<.05 , 5 1 = .28, 5 2 = .02 for puts) 
and effective spreads (t = 7.39, p <.001 , 5 1 = 1.35, 5 2 = 
0.95 for calls and t = 3.4, p < .OO l , 5 1 = 1.43, 5 2 = 1.23 for 
puts) . Table 2 above provides a relati ve freq uency 
distribution showing that quoted spreads c luster at lower 
levels for multiple-li sted options and at hi gher levels for 
single-listed options [> .25 for quoted spreads of single-
listed calls and puts, <= .1 for multiple-li sted ca ll s and 
Journal of Business and Leadership : Research. Prac t1 c~ . and Teachmg 
puts; > .30 fo r effective spreads of sin gle listed ca ll s and 
puts, and < .1 for multiple- li sted ca ll s and puts]. 
Table 3 be low shows the descripti ve stat isti cs of the 
samp le. S ingle-li sted ca ll and put options are offered by 
finns with considerably lower market capitalizations 
averaging app roximately $ 1.3 million wh ile multiple-
li sted options have about $ 13 mil li on. It fo ll ows that 
similar differences are observed in the volume of trades 
(< 100 for single-listed options versus > 150 for 
multiple-listed options) indicating not surpri s ingly, that 
multiple-li sted options are more active ly traded . 
However, vo latility measures are comparable ranging 
fro m 0.3-0 .7 for each type of opti on. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Single and Multiple-Listed Options 
Single-Lis ted Ca ll Options Mean Standard 
N ; I ,736 Va riab le Deviation 
Market Cap $ 1.37x 10" 2.69x 10" 
Price 1.9972 2.4848 
Volume 21769 33 .9793 
Volatili ty 0 7026 06998 
Multi ple-Listed Ca ll Options Mean Sta ndard 
N ; 8.841 Variable Devia ti on 
Market Cap 13.40x 10" 55.84 x I 0" 
Price 2.4625 3.078 1 
Volume 202.6029 619.4039 
Volatili ty 0 .640 1 0.5992 
Single-Listed Put Options Mean Standard 
N ; I ,320 Vari able Deviati on 
Market Cap 1.2 1 X 10° 2.20x 10" 
Price 1.91 39 2.1566 
Volume 93 5303 153.8 19 1 
Vola tility 0 50 16 0.3200 
Multiple-Listed Put Options Mean Standard 
N ; 7,279 Variable Deviati on 
Market Cap 13.42x 10" 72 .23 X I 0" 
Price 2 .4734 2.8777 
Volume 154 .6 15 549 96 
Vola tility 0 .5048 0.385 1 
To test the hypotheses, the Nea l ( 1987) fo1111u lation 
was used to create four mode ls of bid-ask spreads. 
Linear, logarithmic, squared logarithmi c, and quare root 
functional forms were tested for the fo llowing mode l: 
BAP, = o.1 + f31PRC1 + f32 VOL1 + f33 VLTLY1 + fJ~PRCF, 
+ f35ML, + f36 VOLYML + f37TME, ( l ) 
Where : 
BAP, = Quoted spreads measured as (Ask Pri ce - Bid 
Price) and Effecti ve spreads measured as [ABS(Trade 
Pri ce - (Ask+Bid)/2]. 
PRC, = Option p1ice = [Bid + Ask] 
2 
VOL, = Daily option vo lume 
23 
Minimum Maximum 25% 50% 75% 
Quart il e Quartile Quartile 
34,946 19.83x 10" 225,892 509,666 1.3 x I 0" 
0.025 14.50 0 .125 0.125 3.2 
I 249 5 7.8 21 
0 .037 0 .763 0 .32 0 .3 5 0 .78 
Minimum Maximum 25% 50% 75% 
Quartile Quartile Quartile 
15.7 13 952.70x 106 557 .875 2.25x 106 8.13 X 10" 
02 49 9 0 .1 I -1.15 
I 11 135 10 33 127 
0 .0092 0 .86079 0 .3 158 0.4662 0.70735 
Min imum Maximum 25% 50% 75% 
Quart ile Quartil e Quartil e 
34,946 19.83 X I 0" 241 ,926 509,666 1.2 1 X 10" 
0025 12.65 0 .225 1.125 2.85 
677 I 5 .25 2-1 .5 91 75 
0 .1169 0 .2677 0 .302 0.-11 1 0 582 
Minimum Maxi mum 25% 50°o 75°·o 
Quarti le Quart il e Quartil e 
15,7 13 1.-1 0 X 10" 532,436 1.90 x 106 7 58x 106 
0.025 66.65 0 .102 1.325 4.05 
I 107.39 10 26 103 
0 .0 1 0 .778 0 .299 0 .-110 0 .585 
VLTLY, = O ption volatility = T he implied standard 
deviation from the Black-Scho les model 
ML, = Multiple listing dummy; 0 = s ing le li sted options 
and I = multiple-listed options 
PRCF1 = Low price correction factor (0 fo r price > .5, l 
for price < .5) 
VOLxML = T he mu lti pl e li st ing-vo lu me interaction 
TME = Time to maturi ty 
A ll mode ls used quoted and effective preads as the 
criteri a. The use of both spreads is justifi ed in that they 
provide a comprehensive descri ption of spreads, ,,·it h 
quoted spreads show ing the quoted buy and se ll pri ces, 
and effective spreads reflec ting actual tran sac tion prices 
which may be different from quoted prices. T he Guj rati 
and Maita l correc ti on for l'irst-orde r au toc01Tebrion and 
weighted least squares correct ion fo r hcteroscedasti city 
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wa appli ed to fu nctiona l forms tested inc luding the 
linear, loga1ithmic, sq uared logari thm and square root 
fom1 s of vo lume. 
Resu lts 
Hypothese 1-4 were supported w ith price , vo lume , 
vo la tility and mu ltiple li sting being hi ghl y s ignificant in 
expla ining preads. Price pos itive ly intluenced spreads 
be ing the sing le most powerfu l predictor in 14 of 16 
mode l for bo th quoted and effect ive spread fo r put and 
ca ll options (t va lues ranged from 3.57- 15.96). 
A ltho ugh vo la tili ty has shown incons istent s ign in 
previous studies (see Khoury e t a !. , 2002 for a review), 
Joumal of 13usiness and L.eadership : Research, Practi ce, and Teaching 
in th is case its effect on spreads was predominantly 
positi ve in 14 of 16 models, possibly indicating the 
presence of a ri sk prem ium demanded by market makers 
for moving off the effic ient fTonti er. Volume and 
multiple li sting were inversely related to spreads. The 
in teraction between volume and multiple li sting was 
ignifi cantl y negative (p< .Ol ) indicating that multiple 
li sting acted in conj unction with vo lume to significantly 
red uce spreads in a ll models or the variance due to 
competit ion and that due to increased volume jointly 
explai ned an average of 4% of the variance in call 
options and 3% of the vari ance in spreads for put options 
respecti ve ly. 
Tab le 4: Regressions of Bid-Ask Spreads on Call and Put Options 
Quoted Spreads Mode l I 
(Call s) 
Price .02 -1*** 
( 15.96) 
Volume .J. .J X \0' 
(-J .OO) 
Vol ume' 
M ulti ple Lts ll ng -. 11 *** 
(-7. 83) 
Vo lume x -4 X 
Mu lilpl c L1st tng 10 5"' 
(-J.60) 
Vo la lll tty .009*** 
(3 .J I l 
Lo" Pncc Factor 
-.002 
(-1.6(1) 






Vo lume -1.6 X I 0 °*** 
(-4.27) 
Volume· 
1\lult•plc I J>t1ng - 12* ....... 
(-2 77) 
Volume' -.J X 
1\lulurlc l1st•ng JO-'*H 
(-3 33) 
Vobttht) 26*** 
(7 .35 ) 
I "" !'nee \ ·actor 23*** 
(2 .58 ) 
ftme 03 
(I.J) 
\{ ' 09 
*p· o5. ••r· .o!, *"* r· .oo 1 
t rat10..., 111 parcn the.,t.:s 
Model 2 Mode l J 
(Cal b ) (Call s) 
.025 *** .022 *** 
(8.88) ( 16 .98 ) 
-\.08 X \0 -7.9 X 10 " 
(--1 .52) (-2 .00 ) 
-2. \ 8 X \0 
(-7.43) 
-.09 *** -.09*** 
(-9.5J) (- 1 0.47) 
- \ X - \ .67 X 
10 , . 10"2*** 
(-2 .0 1) (- 12.2J ) 
009**' .009*** 
(3 3 I ) (J.J I) 
-8 
.0 12" .. X 10 -' 
(2 -16) (- .49 ) 
0 17* ' .0 12** 
(2 .59) (2 .59) 
14 .20 
.0(>9*'* .065 *** 
(4 .5J) ( 13. 18) 
-8.4 X 
I 0 ' *** -.OJ *** 
(- 1. 87 ) (4 .95 ) 
-.026** 
(-3.28) 
- I I* -.09 * 
(-2 .5-1) (-2 .09) 
- 1 \ -. 14*** 
10 1 (-5 .37) 
(- 1 gxl 
26** * .04* 
(R .S-1 ) ( 1.83) 
2] *** -.02*** 
(4 9R ) (-4 .89) 
.03 .03 
(1 -1 ) (I.J) 
09 17 
Model 4 Modell Model 2 Mode l J Mode l 4 
(Ca lls ) (Puts) (Put s) (Puts) ( Puts) 
.025 *** .076*** .076* ** .02*** .I *** 
(8 .57) (3 .57) (J.57 ) (5 .27) (J.76) 
- \ .3 X IQ'' ' -J X -3 .2 X 10·>' - \ .2 X 10·· -7 .4 X 10·J' 
(-781) Jo·'" ' (-4 . 14) (- 1.69) (-2.35) 
(·4 . 14) 
-6 X 10-' 
( 1.96) 
-.09** -.06 -. 1 J ** -. I *** -. 1 J ** 
(-11 .59) (-.46) ( ·2 . 9~) (-4 .64) (-2 .98) 
-4 X -9 X -8 .6 X -4 -9 
10"1*** 1 o·'••• 10 5'" X X 
(-J. 60) (-2 .85) (-2.85) JO_, .. I 0-
5*** 
(2 .89) (-2.85) 
.0 I J *** .476*** .476*** .009 .5 *** 
(J. 80) (3 .6 1) (36 1) (. 88) (J .58) 
5.8 X I O-' .I*** 
-.002J . I J 5*** . 135*** (.06) (3.4 J ) 
(- 1.03) (3. 59) (3.59) 
.0 17* . II I . II I .0069 . 11 7 
(2.49) (1.70 ) (1.70) (.70) ( 1. 80) 
. 13 .08 .OJ .09 .03 
069*** . 144*** . 107*** . I* ** . I *** 
(4 .58) (6 .98) (7.85) (4 .98) (7 .05) 
- 1.3 x !O·· ••• -2 -6 -.0265* 2 x I O-' 
(-J.59) X 10"' X (- 1.90) (- .09) 




-. 12** -.2 1 ** -.22*** -.2 1** -.2** * 
(-2 .65) (-2 .85) (-3 .9J ) (-2 .85) (-J .9) 
4 X -1.2 X JO-'*** -2 X - \. 2 X - \ X 
1 o····· (·2 .54 ) I 0-4 *** 10-' " 10 ' ' " 
(-J.JJ) (-5 . 15) (-2 .54) ( -3.4) 
.OJ .001 .2J ** .OJ .3*** 
( I .4 1) ( I 28) (2.J9) (0 .59) (J .68) 
.2J *** -.OJ - 02 -0 1 -OJ 
(2 .58) (-4 8) (-.3J ) (- 19) (- 4 8) 
.OJ 06 .06 .OS .06 
( I . .J ) ( I .4) (1 .-1) (.6 1) ( I .J ) 
.09 . 18 . 10 . 10 .10 
24 5
Abraham and Harrington: Determinants of Option Spreads In A Multiple Listing Environment
Published by FHSU Scholars Repository, 2006
Abraham and Harrington 
Multiple li sting emerged as the more powerful 
predictor in relation to volume with full y 3 .8-5.2% of the 
variance in spreads being explained by multipl e li sting 
as opposed to only .8-3.4% by vo lume for quoted 
spreads of call options. For quoted spreads of puts, 1.5 % 
of the variance in spreads was explained by multipl e 
listing versus .04-.05% for volume. Multipl e li sting 
showed higher significance in 6 of 8 models for quoted 
spreads and 5 of 8 models for effecti ve spreads. 
CONCLUSION 
In the first empirica l examin ation of cunent options 
markets using all options traded on a maj or exchange 
(the American Stock Exchange) , thi s study has observed 
that bid-ask spreads in a predomi nantl y multiple li sted 
environment are determined by traditional B lack-
Scholes options characteri stics including pri ce, vo lume, 
and volatility along with multiple li sting as a measure of 
competition among exchanges for order tlow . 
Higher priced options command a premium and are 
therefore linked with 1i sing spread s. Vo latili ty effects 
support Stoll 's ( 1978) contention that the assumpti on of 
greater risk leads market makers to demand hi gher 
spreads. Volume effects are more compl ex in nature . By 
definition , economi es of scale in options markets assume 
the existence of ri sing vo lumes of options fo r sale on the 
exchanges which, as vo lume is inverse ly related to 
spreads, dri ves down spreads. Multiple li sting leads to 
ri sing volumes w ith large volumes being assoc iated with 
multipl e li sting (mean volumes fo r multipl e-li sted 
options = 159-202 as opposed to 2 1-93 for s ingle-] is ted 
options) as more options on the sa me stock are avai lable 
for sale on multiple exchanges. Both vo lume (economies 
of scale) and multiple listing reduce spreads. Yet, our 
comparative analys is of mul tiple li sting and vo lume 
indicates that multiple li sting effects dominate volume 
effects. 
In other words, the reduct ion of spreads due to 
competition from other exchanges is more powerfu l that 
similar reductions due to the mere increase in opti ons 
available for sa le up to 4 yea rs after most of the opti ons 
on the AMEX were initi a ll y multipl e listed. Thi s result 
indicates the robu stness of co mpetiti ve effec ts on 
spreads over time and should fom1 the bas is for future 
longitudinal examination s of spreads in the 1, 2, 3, 4 , 
and 5, year period after initi al multipl e li sting. 
Future research should address the underlying causes 
of the importance of mul tipl e li sting in ex pla ining 
spreads. There are tvvo ty pes o f traders, in fo rmed traders 
who seek profit-makin g opportuniti es at lower 
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transactions costs and liquidity traders who wish to add 
options to their portfo li os. We may expect that in a 
multiple-listed environment, both numbers of both types 
of traders wi ll increase, i.e. the liquid ity traders who 
wish to add options which are more readi ly available 
with larger vo lumes, and informed traders who wish to 
find options with greater profit potenti al. Admati and 
Pfleiderer ( 1988) model the effects of informed traders 
h·ading on the same pri vate in formation (presumably 
in formation about an upcoming multiple li sting 
announcement) . Such h·aders wi ll compete with each 
other limi ting their ga ins or reduc ing their losses to the 
market maker who wi ll set lower spreads. Empirica l 
tests of thi s theory may be undertaken using pre- and 
post multi ple li sting options data. 
The equity option s market may be on the c usp of a 
transition in market sh·ucture. Options h·ading on a 
single exchange represented a monopol y with the 
exchanges reaping monopoly profits due to their 
ex istence as a s ing le source fo r a particular option. When 
the Securiti es and Exchange Commi ss ion imposed a 
morat01ium on new listings fro m 1985-1989, the market 
became contestable (Neal, 1987) . In a contestabl e 
market, competitors await the opportunity fo r market 
entry given the existence of significant entry ban·iers . 
The cunent climate of successive waves of multiple 
li sting may have rendered a structure of perfect 
competition in which there is free entry and exist, entry 
barri ers are few, and the product is standardi zed (for 
exa mple, the same option on Coca Cola stock listed on 2 
exchanges is indi stinguishab le). F uture research must 
conduct tests of the options market as a contestable 
market in the mid-1 980 ' s fo llowed by tests for 
competi tive markets fo r data from 2000-present. If the 
market is ivund to be competiti ve , the next research 
question to be addressed is if competiti ve shoJi-run 
equilibrium has been reached. 
Implications 
Spreads ha ve declined since August 1999, when 
options first became mul tip le listed to a large extent. 
T herefore, it is less expensive for h·aders to purchase 
options possibl y stimul ating an increase in options 
trading. Sma ller h·aders who were not able to trade in 
equi ty opti ons are in a positi on to enter the options 
market. As the opti ons market offe rs the benefit of 
un limited upside potential (a lbeit with downside ri sk) , 
such small traders and investors have an expanded arra y 
o f in vestment opportuni ties. For options traded on s ix 
exchanges , i.e the largest fim1s and those tha t became 
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multiple li sted a t the very beginning of the opti ons 
campa ign, suc h as LBM, Motoro la, WaiMart , and 
Johnson & Jo hnson, the spread dec lines a re substantial. 
ln the wake of the uncerta inty in the finan cial marke ts 
fol lowing the e vents of September 1 I , 200 I , new li stings 
have been predominantly in thi category. Further 
reductions in spreads benefi t traders who choose to trade 
in these options. 
Electron ic lTadi ng commenced in 1999 with the 
OJ ening of the In ternational Securiti es Exchange, the 
first ful ly e lectroni ca ll y traded exchange . Th is was 
fo ll owed two years later with the opening of the Boston 
Exchange. T he In ternationa l Sec uriti es Exchange, in 
particular, has diverted order flo w fro m the fl oor-based 
exchanges. For exampl e, illM 's primary exchange (the 
exchange on which the bul k of its opt ions were traded) 
was the C hicago Board Options Exc hange for severa l 
yea rs. Today, illM 's pnmary exchange IS the 
Intemational Securities Exchange. S uch di vers ion has 
occurred to the ex tent that the fl oor-based exchanges 
have started thei r own e lectronic trading d ivisions. 
Traders should benefit as spreads continue to decline 
with e lectronic trading. 
Exchanges have attempted to protect thei r profit 
margins by engagi ng in payment for order fl ow, 
whereby they pay customers for the di, ersion of order 
flow to themse lve . Such practices arc being cu11ai led by 
the Securit1 es and Exchan ge Commi ss ion as ind icated by 
a recent rejection of a request by the Pac ifi c Stock 
I:xchange to expand payment for order flow . T he 
regulatory environment appears to favo r a free fa ll in 
spreads to the advan tage of traders. 
Market makers may be ab le to pro li t from dec linin g 
spreads as part of a hedging strategy. If s tock prices 
declme, they may short sel l ca lls w hereby they borrow 
ca ll opt ions. sell them, at h igher spreads, and repay ca ll 
O\\ ners '' 1 th calls at reduced spreads. J f stock pri ces ri se, 
they may short se ll puts whe re a s imil ar seque nce or 
e\ent will occur ''ith puts instead of ca ll s. Empirically, 
such act l\lty mJy be tested by exam ining dai ly short 
sak:. va lues and the change 111 daily put ca ll ra ti os. 
C11 \ en that market makers are attempting to e rect ba rr iers 
to entry through payment for o rder fl ow, it is poss ible 
th:ll they hJ\'e not embarked on suc h a hedg in g stra tegy 
at th1~ t1me. 
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